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ACCOUNTABILITY AND DECISION MAKING IN AUTONOMOUS
WARFARE: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
Amos N. Guiora*
Abstract
Who is the enemy? How can you distinguish between the
civilians and the noncivilians? The same people who come and
work in the bases at daytime, they just want to shoot and kill you
at nighttime. So how can you distinguish between the two? The
good or the bad? All of them looked the same.1
This Article addresses the use of autonomous weapons systems
(“AWS”). This Article only concerns itself with AWS used for offensive
purposes. That is distinct from defensive weapons systems, including
Israel’s Iron Dome2 and U.S. missile defense systems.3 Similarly, this
Article does not address use of AWS for purposes of neutralizing
Improvised Explosive Devices (“IED”) or evacuating a wounded soldier.
The use of AWS potentially minimizes risks to soldiers—at least in
the short term. It suggests sleek technology. The dead are a hazy visual on
a screen. It is antiseptic, as neither the smell of burning flesh nor the sound
of agony can be heard by those programming the AWS or those sitting
behind a screen observing the effects of a “hit.” Autonomous warfare has
also been positively portrayed in Hollywood movies; technological
sophistication inherently possesses an undeniable “cool” factor that is
engaging, engrossing, and compelling. However, the positive lens with
which it is viewed through Hollywood is a limited glimpse of its role.
Weapons created for the purpose of autonomously determining when
the nation-state can kill a human being raises profoundly important
questions regarding humanity, ethics, and defense. While the use of force
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MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LAI 74 (1992).
2
See Israel Defense Forces: Iron Dome Missile Defense System, JEWISH VIRTUAL
LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/IronDome.html [https://perma.cc/
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3
See U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug. 17,
2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense [https://perma.cc/VDE558DN].
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by the nation-state is regulated, whether by international law or rules of
engagement, the introduction of AWS challenges the notion of whether—
and at what point—proposed decision making should be removed from
human control and judgment.
INTRODUCTION
The use of AWS is an issue of great and pressing significance. While for some
it is but a figment of their imagination, reality suggests otherwise: “Most technical
experts . . . assume that it is only a matter of time before such systems are
operational. The US Department of Defense has drawn up an official plan to develop
and bring into service autonomous systems increasingly up to 2038.”4
There is, then, great urgency in this discussion. The question, in its starkest
form, is whether “kill” decisions should be made by man or machine. The decision
is distinct from the implementation. The question is whether nation-states should
adopt weapons systems whereby “human life would be devalued if life and death
decisions were ceded to a machine.”5
My primary objections to AWS are two-fold: (i) accountability and (ii)
removing humans from use of force decision making. These two concerns were
addressed in an Open Letter signed by 1,000 leading Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics Researchers. The concerns articulated below reflect my profound
discomfort with AWS:
Autonomous weapons select and engage targets without human
intervention. They might include, for example, armed quadcopters that can
search for and eliminate people meeting certain pre-defined criteria, but
do not include cruise missiles or remotely piloted drones for which humans
make all targeting decisions. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has
reached a point where the deployment of such systems is — practically if
not legally — feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high:
autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in
warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms.
Many arguments have been made for and against autonomous
weapons, for example that replacing human soldiers by machines is good
by reducing casualties for the owner but bad by thereby lowering the
threshold for going to battle. The key question for humanity today is
whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting.

4

ROBIN GEISS, THE INTERNATIONAL-LAW DIMENSON OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
SYSTEMS 4 (2015) http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/11673.pdf [https://perma.cc/C29GDHK9]; Chris Cole, BAE Systems Pushing Ahead with Autonomous Drone Targeting,
DRONE WARS UK (Nov. 6, 2016), https://dronewars.net/2016/06/11/bae-systems-pushingahead-with-autonomous-drone-targeting/ [https://perma.cc/6MEU-3FMN].
5
GEISS, supra note 4.
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If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon
development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint
of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will
become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they
require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become
ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce.
It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market
and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their
populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc.
Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations,
destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a
particular ethnic group. We therefore believe that a military AI arms race
would not be beneficial for humanity. There are many ways in which AI
can make battlefields safer for humans, especially civilians, without
creating new tools for killing people.6
This Article reflects my own personal experience while serving in the Israel Defense
Forces Judge Advocate General Corps.
Examining future application of AWS requires distinguishing from present-day
Drone Warfare (“DW”). The two, while arguably similar, have significant
differences. They are not to be confused: AWS reflects minimizing human decision
making; DW is predicated on human decision making.
While the primary, current use of DW is by nation-states engaged in operational
counterterrorism, it can be similarly applied in traditional war between nation-states.
One does not come at the expense of the other; one does not negate the other. This
Article assumes AWS can be used in both.
To address these issues, this Article is divided into five sections. First, I give
an overview of autonomous warfare systems and drone warfare. Second, I discuss
international law and decision making. Third, I review the current implementation
of legal standards in practice. Fourth, I recommend solutions for ensuring
compliance. Finally, I conclude.
I. AUTONOMOUS WARFARE SYSTEMS AND DRONE WARFARE: AN OVERVIEW
“Autonomous warfare” does not have a universal, much less unanimous,
definition. The fact that there are so many definitions is indicative of the uncertainty
surrounding this developing means of warfare. One definition of an “autonomous

6

Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers, FUTURE OF
LIFE INST. (July 28, 2015),
http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons
[https://perma.cc/6MEU-3FMN].
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system” is “a machine, whether hardware or software, that, once activated, performs
some task or function on its own.”7
Another definition states that a truly autonomous system “must be capable of
independently interpreting higher-level intent and direction then analysing its
physical and operational context in order to make decisions and act independent of
further human influence.”8
The definition used in this Article defines AWS as weapons systems that
identify and attack without any direct human control.9 This definition crystalizes the
essence of autonomous warfare; the lack of direct human control is the basis for the
deep skepticism expressed in this Article.
The seeming benefits of AWS are understandable and largely self-explanatory.
The concerns—perhaps hesitation—that I seek to convey in this Article focus on
minimizing human involvement in the decision to attack with the intent to kill
another human being. That is relevant to both forms of the use of force, traditional
warfare, and operational counterterrorism.
My experience in operational counterterrorism reflects heavy reliance on
checklists. The essence of checklists is human analysis of distinct decision points
reflecting both tactical and strategic considerations. Nuance is at the core of the
decision-making process. Sensitivity to an extraordinarily wide range of decision
points demands standards of accountability for consequences arising from an attack.
While the commander’s decision should incorporate as much information as
possible from as many sources as possible, reflecting multiple vectors and variables,
the real-time decision whether to engage an individual must rest in the commander’s
hands. President Harry S. Truman’s classic phrase “the buck stops here” is the
ultimate manifestation of command. A weapons system devoid of human decision
making must raise serious—and legitimate—doubts regarding its legality and
morality.
According to the Human Rights Watch report “Losing Humanity: The Case
Against Killer Robots”:
[R]obots are essentially machines that have the power to sense and act
based on how they are programmed. They all possess some degree of
autonomy, which means the ability of a machine to operate without human
7

Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon
Systems 5 (Feb. 13, 2015) (working paper), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/anintroduction-to-autonomy-in-weapon-systems [https://perma.cc/PC7N-S6B3].
8
Jim Bledon, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Humanity’s Best Hope?, LEADING
EDGE: AIRPOWER IN THEORY & PRAC. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://leadingedgeairpower.com/20
15/09/01/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-humanitys-best-hope/ [https://perma.cc/F5X
T-BXR3].
9
See Autonomous Weapons Systems – Q & A, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Nov.
12, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems-challengehuman-control-over-use-force [https://perma.cc/7LVZ-H4WG] (stating that “[a]utonomous
weapon systems . . . independently search for, identify and attack targets without human
intervention”).
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supervision. The exact level of autonomy can vary greatly. Robotic
weapons, which are unmanned, are often divided into three categories
based on the amount of human involvement in their actions:
•
•
•

Human-in-the Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver
force only with a human command;
Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and
deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override
the robots’ actions; and
Human-out-of-the Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting
targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.10

My primary concern is the “out of the loop” paradigm; however, I wish to raise a
voice of concern regarding both “in the loop” and “on the loop.” The concern reflects
the troubling reality regarding the speed of technological advancement and
development. Breaking the paradigms “in,” “on,” and “out” into their distinct
variables highlights the necessity of focusing on five particular terms: humans,
AWS, robots, target selection, and force delivery. The concept of “speed” is essential
to this discussion because the narrowing of the deliberation window, between
decision to implementation, is a prime component of AWS.
There is great danger in this, particularly when human decision making is
removed from the process. Human decision making reflects consideration,
deliberation, reflection, and doubt;11 the ultimate manifestation of AWS is machine
selection-force delivery devoid of human involvement. The sensitivity, nuance, and
ability to reconsider a decision reflects daily human conduct. That is of particular
importance and relevance when the decision at hand is whether to kill another human
being. The following highlights the complexity of the decision-making process and
the requirement that accountability be an integral part of the process.
In 1992, Abbas Moussaka, leader of Hizbollah at the time, and his wife and
children were killed by missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter while driving a car
in Lebanon.12
According to news reports, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) had identified
Moussaka as a legitimate target. However, when the decision was made to
10

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH.,
LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 2 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots https://www.hrw.org/report/
2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots
[https://perma.cc/2YK5-3G4S];
Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking the
Man Out of the Loop” 21 (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files
/3894-corn-understanding-the-loop-regulating-the-next [https://perma.cc/L68H-G4VQ].
11
For a fascinating, important and in-depth discussion of this issue, see DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
12
Mitchell Prothero, Hisbollah Positions Nasrallah’s Successor, THE NATIONAL (Oct.
23,
2008),
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/hizbollah-positionsnasrallahs-successor [https://perma.cc/W6WZ-PNHM].
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implement the planned attack, it was realized that his children were traveling with
him. The question was whether to continue with the planned attack. The decision
was made, in accordance with a limited operational window of opportunity and
given the threat he posed, to strike Moussaka regardless. The decision was the
subject of public discussion in Israel. What is important for the purpose of this
Article is that the decision to go forth—regardless of the known collateral damage—
was made by senior military commanders who fully understood its ramifications and
consequences. There was the possibility, in accordance with their decision-making
process, to cancel the operation. That is distinct from the “out of the loop” paradigm,
devoid of reversibility of decisions made and accountability for their consequences.
Similarly, the issue of accountability is of great importance. It goes without
saying that all decisions have ramifications. In the military context, commanders and
soldiers whose decisions result in misdeed—from the mundane to the grave—are
subject to disciplinary sanctions and court martials. Commanders may suffer careerending consequences.
That is the essence of consequential decision making; a system devoid of
accountability is in direct contrast to the profession of arms. There is a direct
relationship between decision making and accountability. “Kill/not kill” decisions
authorized by the nation-state where standards of accountability are neither inherent
nor integral is akin to authorizing the new Wild West.
In the “in” paradigm, human command is necessary for target selection and
force delivery. In the “on” model, AWS can target and deliver, but humans can
override an AWS’s action. And in the “out” model, AWS can target and deliver
without any any available recourse for human operators.
Presently, there appears to be a transition from an “in” to an “on” paradigm,
with the “out” process reflecting the trajectory of autonomous warfare research.
Given this direction of research and resources, it can be presumed with a reasonable
degree of certainty that future autonomous warfare developments will pursue
adoption and implementation of the “out” paradigm.
The legitimacy of a military action by the nation-state demands that
accountability be integral to its undertaking. This is particularly apt when the
intention is to kill a human being. The decision to do so must not be casually
undertaken. Accordingly, developing clear accountability standards and criteria is
essential. The loop categories are relevant because they articulate the limits of
autonomous warfare. Needless to say, accountability incorporates clear standards of
legality and morality.
The discussion of limits is directly related to the evolution of autonomous
warfare, the construction of AWS, the programming of autonomous weapons, and
the extent to which commanders will control the implementation of AWS, either in
traditional warfare or operational counterterrorism. Limits to the use of force are
relevant both to present application of autonomous warfare and the future
implementation of autonomous systems. The importance of limits cannot be
sufficiently emphasized.
Predicated on my experience, all three paradigms cause me concern—primarily
because I am not convinced of the articulation and application of limits with respect
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to the definition of imminence, the definition of legitimate target, and the application
of force. These three uncertainties are of extraordinary importance in a paradigm
where human decision making and command accountability are minimized.
A minimization of human decision making and accountability is the inevitable
result of the transition from the “in” to the “out” paradigm. The combination of both
minimizations—if not eviscerations—has profoundly significant consequences
regarding the limits of application. Rearticulated, the “out” model suggests that
limits on imminence, targets, and power will be cast asunder.
There is a very real probability that the attempt to calculate and quantify the
imminence, targets, and power, will create a nonhuman vector of decision making
capable of calculating significantly amoral judgments. The ramifications are
extraordinarily disturbing, posing significant questions regarding the nature of future
military engagement. Analysis of the three categories highlights the requirement to
question the legitimacy, legality, and morality of autonomous warfare.
Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley wrote: “For some types of target sets in
relatively uncluttered environments, it is already possible to build systems that can
identify, target and engage enemy forces, although current DOD guidelines direct
that a human be in the loop for offensive lethal force decisions.”13
If autonomous warfare accomplishes the following three goals, then opposition
to its increased use is, seemingly, illogical and counter-intuitive: (i) minimal loss of
life to soldiers, (ii) minimal collateral damage, and (iii) enhanced accuracy regarding
the specifically identified target.
All three goals, individually and collectively, are laudable, legitimate, and
defensible. What national security decision maker would not favor enhanced use of
AWS if these are the results? What politician would not tout their effectiveness and
laud their success to a national public? What public would discourage enhanced use
if autonomous warfare ensures that the “bad guys” get killed and the “good guys”
are safe?
If drones are increasingly the weapons of choice in contemporary
counterterrorism, then, according to its advocates, AWS are the future weapons of
choice. However, caveats are important since establishing boundaries is essential to
ensuring legitimacy. In February 2013, a Department of Justice White Paper entitled
“Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior
Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force”14 was leaked to the press.
The White Paper is the clearest articulation of the Obama Administration’s Drone
Policy.

13

ROBERT O. WORK & SHAWN BRIMLEY, 20YY: PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE ROBOTIC
AGE 24 (2014).
14
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED
FORCE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper], http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW8E-CR2Y].
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Widely criticized,15 the White Paper states the following:
[T]he United States would be able to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen,
who is located outside the United States and is an operational leader
continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in at least
the following circumstances: (1) where an informed, high-level official of
the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) where a
capture operation would be infeasible—and where those conducting the
operation continue to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3)
where such an operation would be conducted consistent with applicable
law of war principles.16
The concern with the White Paper regarding autonomous warfare focuses on two
critical terms, imminence and legitimate target. According to the White Paper,
imminence pertaining to a legitimate target is defined as follows:
[T]he condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of
violent attack against the United States does not require the United States
to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests
will take place in the immediate future.17
How both terms are defined and applied in real time—when operational decision
making is fraught with danger and tension—is of critical importance. The Obama
Administration’s definitions are of great concern because they enable a drone policy
devoid of strict limits and narrow criteria. Possible application of that model to AWS
raises grave concern.
The Obama Administration’s policy has been the subject of much scrutiny and
criticism.18 Nevertheless, the decisions are made by humans, whether located in a
15

Michael T. Geary & Ryan Mihalyak, US Presidential Authority and Domestic Drone
Missile Strikes, 8 HOMELAND SECURITY REV. 237, 237 (2014); David Kaye, International
Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Targeted Killing, 17 AM. SOC’Y OF
INT’L L., Feb.15, 2013, at 4, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight130215.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV3E-6RW9]; Claire Pritchard, Finger on the Joystick: A Drone Expert
Weighs in on American Policy, CHI. POL’Y REV. (Mar. 8, 2013), http://chicagopolicyreview.
org/2013/03/08/finger-on-the-joystick-a-drone-expert-on-americas-controversial-policy/
[https://perma.cc/CR8D-4CLF].
16
DOJ White Paper, supra note 14, at 6.
17
Id. at 7.
18
Marie Aronsson, Remote Law-Making? American Drone Strikes and the
Development of Jus Ad Bellum, 1 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 273, 273–98 (2014); William
Funk, Deadly Drones, Due Process, and the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 311, 334–36 (2013); Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All
Out of Proportion, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 255–57 (2012); Trevor McCrisken,
Obama’s Drone War, 55 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY 97, 104 (2013); Jake
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U.S. military installation in Nevada or overseas. Those making the decisions are,
literally, operating the much discussed “joy stick” whilst significantly removed from
the actual battlefield or killing zone.
Nevertheless, the “kill/not kill” decision is not made by machine. Much
literature has addressed how involvement in DW impacts operators;19 similarly,
research has also focused on how DW impacts communities whose members have
been targeted by drones.20
The drone discussion is of particular relevance in examining autonomous
warfare for the following reason: Criticism of drone policy focuses on the broad
articulation of the legitimate target and imminence while implemented by humans.
Autonomous warfare, on the other hand, seeks to remove humans from the decisionmaking loop while applying broad standards devoid of human intervention and
control.
On July 1, 2016 the Obama Administration released statistics regarding U.S.
drone policy. The assessment below by the New York Times reflects the very
concern this paper seeks to emphasize—the “normalization” of drone attacks
combined with terms that beg precise definition, much less consistent
implementation with clear standards of accountability. If that is the case with drones
William Rylatt, An Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of “Targeted Killing” Under International
Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi (Part I), 44 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 39, 52 (2014); Amitai
Etzioni, The Great Drone Debate, MILITARY REV., Apr. 1, 2013,
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430
_art004.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR2A-ESLK]; Jane Mayer, Torture and Obama’s Drone
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.sennhs.org/ourpages/auto/2015/5/19/
65556542/Torture%20and%20Obama_s%20Drone%20Program%20by%20Jane%20Mayer
_2_15_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWN2-UELH].
19
James Dao, Drone Pilots Are Found to Get Stress Disorders as Much as Those in
Combat Do, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/dronepilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html [https://perma.cc/UZ
22-VTX7]; Rebecca Hawkes, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Is Higher in Drone
Operators, TELEGRAPH (May 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/hayfestival/11639746/Post-traumatic-stress-disorder-is-higher-in-drone-operators.html
[https://perma.cc/2ADT-FQ2X]; Denise Chow, Drone Wars: Pilots Reveal Debilitating
Stress Beyond Virtual Battlefield, LIVE SCIENCE (Nov. 5, 2013) http://www.livescience.com/
40959-military-drone-war-psychology.html
[https://perma.cc/L4TU-ML6C];
Dan
Gettinger, Burdens of War: PTSD and Drone Crews, CTR. FOR STUDY DRONE BARD C. (Apr.
21, 2014), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/burdens-war-crews-drone-aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/
7BVT-JJT4].
20
See CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT COLUM. LAW
SCH., THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES 19–27 (2012); Conor Friedersdorf,‘Every Person Is
Afraid of the Drones’: The Strikes’ Effect on Life in Pakistan, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/every-person-is-afraid-of-thedrones-the-strikes-effect-on-life-in-pakistan/262814/ [https://perma.cc/5EP6-QEMC]; Chris
Woods, ‘Drones Causing Mass Trauma Among Civilians,’ Major Study Finds, BUREAU
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012
/09/25/drones-causing-mass-trauma-among-civilians-major-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/
R9SC-3PE4].
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operated by human beings—whether U.S. military personnel or C.I.A. agents—then
concern regarding AWS is significantly amplified.
The disclosure about civilian deaths and the executive order, the subject
of months of bureaucratic deliberations, carried broader significance.
Issued about seven months before Mr. Obama leaves office, the order
further institutionalized and normalized airstrikes outside conventional
war zones as a routine part of 21st-century national security policy.21
The admittedly long quote below from the White House Fact Sheet is of great
relevance to this Article. Rhetoric and language aside—whether convincing is an
open question—the document articulates how the U.S. drone policy is implemented
and its consequences. Whether the purpose of the Fact Sheet was to impress upon
critics that standards exist and are applied or to mollify concerned voices regarding
limited civilian deaths is a matter of interpretation.
What stands out for our purposes is the terminology—semantics of warfare—
regarding legitimate targets. In other words, who is targetable and what are the
criteria for determining whether that person is now a legitimate target based on
standards of certainty?
Flourishing language aside, that decision point is extraordinarily nuanced and
subject to a remarkable number of vectors. As troubling as the document is regarding
standards of accountability, relevant terminology, and civilian deaths, concern is
magnified when recognizing that AWS suggest an inherently murky model will be
devoid of human control and oversight.
The relevant section of the Fact Sheet states as follows:
In May 2013, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG)
that, among other things, set forth policy standards for U.S. direct action
outside the United States and outside areas of active hostilities. These
policy standards generally include that the United States will use lethal
force only against a target that poses a ‘continuing, imminent threat to U.S.
persons,’ and that direct action will be taken only if there is ‘near certainty’
that the terrorist target is present and ‘near certainty’ that non-combatants
will not be killed or injured. As the President has said, the ‘near certainty’
standard is the ‘highest standard we can set.’

21

Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll from Airstrikes Outside War
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-revealsdeath-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html [https://perma.cc/34JY-WDJ3]; see
also Scott Shane, Drone Strike Statistics Answer Few Questions, and Raise Many, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/drone-strikestatistics-answer-few-questions-and-raise-many.html?emc=edit_th_20160704&nl=todays
headlines&nlid=59850316&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/R77R-3X2M] (questioning the value of
statistics to evaluate the effectiveness of drone strikes).
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Thus, unlike terrorist organizations, which deliberately target civilians and
violate the law of armed conflict, the United States takes great care to
adhere to the law of armed conflict and, in many circumstances, applies
policy standards that offer protections for civilians that exceed the
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Moreover, even when the
United States is not operating under the PPG—for example, when the
United States is taking action in ‘areas of active hostilities,’ such as it is
today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, or when the United States is acting
quickly to defend U.S. or partner forces from attack—the United States
goes to extraordinary lengths to minimize the risk of civilian casualties.
In particular, in dealing with enemy forces that do not wear uniforms or
carry their arms openly, the United States goes to great lengths to apply
the fundamental law of armed conflict principle of distinction, which,
among other things, requires that attacks be directed only against military
objectives and not against civilians and civilian objects. The United States
considers all available information about a potential target’s current and
historical activities to inform an assessment of whether the individual is a
lawful target. For example, an individual may be targetable if the
individual is formally or functionally a member of an armed group against
which we are engaged in an armed conflict. As Administration officials
have stated publicly, to determine if an individual is a member of an armed
group, we may look to, among other things: the extent to which the
individual performs functions for the benefit of the group that are
analogous to those traditionally performed by members of a country’s
armed forces; whether that person is carrying out or giving orders to others
within the group; or whether that person has undertaken certain acts that
reliably connote meaningful integration into the group.
Before a strike against a terrorist target is considered in any theater, U.S.
Government personnel review all available information to determine
whether any of the individuals at the location of the potential strike is a
non-combatant. A body of standards, methods, techniques, and computer
modeling, supported by weapons testing data and combat observations,
informs the analysis as to whether those not specifically targeted would
likely be injured or killed in a strike.22

22

See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE
ORDER ON THE US POLICY ON PRE & POST-STRIKE MEASURES TO ADDRESS CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN THE US OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE & THE DNI RELEASE OF
AGGREGATE DATA ON STRIKE OUTSIDE AREA OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (July 1, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-uspolicy-pre-post-strike-measures-address [https://perma.cc/37XK-5GSP].
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An autonomous warfare regime not subject to limits, criteria, and
accountability is, perhaps, tactically enticing. Strategically, however, it is unviable
and unacceptable whether in a court of law or the court of public opinion. I do not
share the enthusiasm of those who articulate benefits accruing from an autonomous
warfare paradigm predicated on autonomous systems. I should note my hesitation is
not predicated on disfavor with the use of power nor does my discomfort reflect not
recognizing the legitimacy of targeting individuals who pose an imminent unjust
threat to innocent individuals.
My concern is quite the opposite: a reflection of decisions in which I have been
involved has led to a deeply ingrained belief that the decision to kill another human
being cannot be “fobbed” off to machines, no matter how sophisticated and
impressive. My belief rests on a values system that places exclusive responsibility
for the decision to kill another human being on a human being.
To create an alternative system where that momentous, irreversible decision is
made and implemented by a machine is the height of abdication of responsibility by
decision makers. It is problematic from both an ethical and practical standpoint.
Ethical because the essence of command is decision making reflecting
accountability; practical because the “go/no go” decision point requires human
sensitivity to the consequences of a mistaken decision.
Professor Ronald C. Arkin, a roboticist from Georgia Tech, has written:
[T]he pressure of an increasing battlefield tempo is forcing autonomy
further and further towards the point of robots making that final, lethal
decision. The time available to make the decision to shoot or not to shoot
is becoming too short for remote humans to make intelligent, informed
decisions in many situations that arise in modern warfare. As that time
dwindles, robots will likely be given more authority to make lethal
decisions on their own.23
Intentionally or unintentionally, Arkin has articulated the dangers posed by
autonomous warfare. The suggestion that “robots will likely be given more authority
to make lethal decisions on their own” greatly unsettles me. The question is the
extent to which human decision making will be minimized.
Professor Arkin has written:
It is my contention that robots can be built that do not exhibit fear, anger,
frustration, or revenge, and that ultimately (and the key word here is
ultimately) behave in a more humane manner than even human beings in
these harsh circumstances and severe duress. People have not evolved to
function in these conditions, but robots can be engineered to function well
in them.24
23

Ronald C. Arkin, Ethical Robots in Warfare, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG., Spring
2009, at 30.
24
Id. at 31.
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That premise holds much promise and optimism regarding robotic, or autonomous,
warfare. The question at hand is whether application of a nation-state’s decision to
implement a killing policy should be subject to human decision making premised on
principles of accountability or be driven by autonomous weapons systems devoid of
human input or interaction.25
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DECISION MAKING
The lack of clearly defined terms raises important concerns. Experience
suggests that wiggle room, the inevitable consequence of amorphousness, results in
significant violations of international law.26 In particular, a lack of clarity regarding
imminent threat and legitimate target suggests a national security paradigm
minimizing protections of individual rights and protections. The concept of balance,
which I believe is essential to a national security policy predicated on the rule of
law, is dependent on state agents’ respect for the individual while engaged in
aggressive operational counterterrorism.
Balancing is an oft-used expression; I am of the opinion that individual rights
must be balanced with national security obligations. The two are equally
legitimate—one does not have preference over the other. The challenge for
operational decision makers is how to respect both while protecting innocent
civilians. That is enormously complicated, requiring sensitivity, recognition of
nuance, and the maturity to “hold fire” when the risk of collateral damage is
unreasonably high.
A decision-making model not predicated on these standards reflects a paradigm
devoid of balance. At its core, operational counterterrorism reflects decision making
intended to protect innocent civilians. This is in accordance with the nation-state’s
primary obligation to protect its civilian population.
However, that does not imply a carte blanche authority to engage any individual
or group suspected of posing a threat to national security, whether broadly or
narrowly defined. The state’s critical burden is ascertaining the threat’s imminence.
Doing so requires assessing and applying international law principles of
proportionality, necessity, collateral damage, and alternatives.
The legal foundation for operational counterterrorism is application of selfdefense principles as articulated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This is
“application by analogy.” The U.N. Charter was established in order to regulate
interaction amongst nation-states, rather than between nation-states and nonstate
25

Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon
Systems: A Primer 7–10 (Mar. 2015) (working paper), https://www.cnas.org/publications/
reports/meaningful-human-control-in-weapon-systems-a-primer [https://perma.cc/KJ5M8TY7].
26
Peter Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command
Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016).
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actors. Nevertheless, the principles are applicable to nation-states conducting
conflict in accordance with, and subject to, standards of lawful self-defense.
Self-defense is not unlimited—its legality depends on its application.
Unrestrained self-defense conducted devoid of standards, limits, and criteria would
run afoul of international law. That is the case regardless whether the nation-state is
in conflict with another nation-state or with nonstate actors.
According to the United Nations Charter, Article 51: “Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”27
Regarding self-defense which reflects the confluence between operational
counterterrorism, decision making, and accountability I have previously written:
“[U]nder what circumstances and subject to what conditions can a commander order
a military unit to preemptively attack an identified enemy. The critical variable in
this discussion is how ‘identified’ the enemy has to be. Perhaps the question can best
be phrased as ‘how certain is certain?’”28
The policy and legal discussions must provide the commander and decision
maker with concrete responses to these questions. Otherwise, not only will the
enemy continue to be unseen, but the guidelines will be unseen as well. That
combination—in the context of operational counterterrorism—is unworkable.
A ‘who, what, when’ analysis of preemptive self-defense will enable the
commander and decisionmaker to better understand who the enemy is.
This analysis inherently presupposes that the nation-state may act; it does
not, however, suggest that the nation-state may always act. The proposed
model explicitly involves limits—after all, the essence of the rule of law
paradigm is an inherent limit on state power. In the self-defense debate,
the critical questions are what are those restraints, when can the nationstate act, against what target, and who is the enemy.29
My experience in targeted killing highlights the requirement for articulated criteria
and a rigorous decision-making process. My decisions were based on application of
a checklist that sought—under time sensitive circumstances—to minimize error and
ensure that the person identified by the intelligence community was indeed “that”
person.
Checklists are guidelines: They provide important contours and boundaries for
the decision maker. They do not, however, provide all the answers. The essence of
decision making is real-time assessment, integrating numerous vector points of
fluctuating importance. While checklists are essential, they do not serve as the final
27

U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1.
Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When, 41
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 638 (2008) (citation omitted).
29
Id.
28
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determinant. The checklist is a critical tool but does not resolve the targeted killing
dilemma.
That, however, is not intended to diminish their importance. It is to emphasize
that there can be no effective substitute for the commander’s decision making based
on integration of all relevant information. Checklists are intended to facilitate threat
analysis and to assess availability of operationally viable alternatives.
The intelligence community works tirelessly to gather and analyze information.
For example, operators determine where best to conduct the attack, policy analysts
weigh geopolitical consequences, lawyers assess whether the policy in general and
as it pertains to a specific hit are conducted in accordance with international law,
and “explainers” prepare statements and explanations in case an operation results in
negative consequences.
All participants, efforts, and resources are focused on one thing—
implementation of a decision to kill an individual. This is reflective of a goal-driven
process. Success is binary: either the individual deemed a legitimate target is killed
or not. Failure is more complicated: An attack that results in collateral damage,
regardless of the actual number of innocent civilians killed, requires explanation,
potentially results in retribution, and can lead to more far-reaching decisions. The
essence of targeted killing is implementation of government policy to kill a
legitimate target believed to pose an imminent threat to national security.
The legality and morality of the policy and its implementation requires a
process in which the commander is the final decision maker. For that reason,
process—with the ultimate decision by an accountable human being—is a requisite
element of a targeted killing decision. This is significantly different from the “out of
the loop” paradigm whereby the application is devoid of human decision making
and accountability.
There is a significant difference between a human-based process and an AWSbased process. The former is predicated on individual assessment of innumerable
real-time variables, where the latter reflects decision making predicated on computer
modeling devoid of human involvement and accountability at the decision-making
point.
Specificity is dependent on process; without developing and implementing a
process-based targeted killing policy, it is nigh impossible to attack specific targets.
Targeted killing decision making highlights process and the centrality of command
responsibility and accountability. Legal justification for a targeted killing is
predicated on a theory of preemptive self-defense. The consequences of the decision
were clear to all parties involved in the decision-making process: If the decision
maker determined that the individual posed an imminent threat to national security
and nonlethal neutralization was not operationally feasible, then killing the
individual was deemed legal.
The four charts below illustrate the complexity of targeted killing analysis.
They are intended to highlight the disparate aspects of the decision-making process,
thereby casting doubt on the viability of AWS. Rearticulated, the charts below
capture the nuance, subtlety, and sensitivity required to analyze inherently subjective
information.
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In addition, the checklist was intended to ascertain that the threat posed was,
indeed, imminent and alternatives to mitigating the threat were not operationally
feasible. The checklist—and the dilemmas it highlights—reinforce the importance
of a human being analyzing the distinct factors integral to a “kill/not kill” decision.
It is an open question whether the significant number of nuanced vectors and
decision points in a targeted killing paradigm can be sufficiently analyzed by an
autonomous weapons system.
Checklists are effective and important with respect to “codifying” both the
human thought process and decision making. The institutionalized, systematic
approach to operational counterterrorism—facilitated by checklists—significantly
contributes to enhancing a systemic process seeking to minimize error while
ensuring final decisions are subject to human discretion and analysis.
This is significantly facilitated by command hierarchies, direct lines of
responsibility, consequences for mistakes, and institutionalized “lessons learned.”
This is distinct from the AWS paradigm—regardless of the loop model applied—
for it leaves the final decision making in human hands. That model is significantly
enhanced by a systematic process.
The decision-making process is fraught with tension and anxiety—the margin
for error is razor thin. “Hit” too early and standards of self-defense are violated; a
“no” decision may enable the actor to go unscathed and result in the deaths of
innocent civilians; “hitting” after the act may violate international law norms
regarding revenge and retribution.
There are four distinct degrees of threats; operational decision making requires
assessing each threat to determine which—if any—counterterrorism measure should
be applied. The threat categories facilitate and determinine the degree of imminence
and whether the identified or suspected threat poses an immediate danger. To act
before the threat is viable would violate articulated standards of legitimate selfdefense.
Determining the legitimacy of a targeted killing requires assessing when the
threat becomes sufficiently viable to order the “hit.” The four degrees are as follows:
Table 1: Threat Degree Categories
Characteristics
Imminent
Threats that will be acted upon shortly and about which a lot
threats
of detail is known.
Foreseeable
Threats that will be carried out in the near future (with no
Threats
specificity). These threats are slightly more remote than those
that are imminent.
Long-Range
Threats that may reach fruition at an unknown time.
Threats
Uncertain
Threats that invoke general fears of insecurity.
Threats
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Assessing whether the intelligence information is actionable requires applying the
four-part intelligence test below. Integral to that analysis is determining the
reliability of the intelligence source.
Table 2: Test for Intelligence Reliability
Test Prong

Definition/Use

Reliability

Past experiences show the source to be a dependable provider of
correct information; requires discerning whether the information
is useful and accurate; demands analysis by the case officer
whether the source has a personal agenda/grudge with respect to
the person identified/targeted.
Is it possible that an attack could occur in accordance with the
source’s information? i.e., the information provided by the
source indicates a terrorist attack that could take place within the
realm of the possible and feasible.
The information has bearing on upcoming events; consider both
the timeliness of the information and whether it is time sensitive
imposing the need for an immediate counterterrorism measure.
Another source (who meets the reliability test above) confirms
the information in whole or part.

Viability

Relevance
Corroboration

Commanders must also determine if the source is biased and reliable when
determining whether the information is actionable. To do so, one should consider
the following:
Table 3: Test for Flaws in Information from Human Sources
Source Bias and Reliability
•
•
•
•

What is the source’s background, and how does that affect the information
provided?
Does the source have a grudge/personal “score” to settle based either on a
past personal or family relationship with the person the information targets or
identifies?
What are the risks to the source if the targeted individual is targeted?
What are the risks to the source if the intelligence is made public?

In addition, the final chart illustrates the requisite analysis regarding the target.
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Table 4: Test to Determine Whether Target is Legitimate
Target
•
•
•
•

What is the person’s role in the terrorist organization?
What insight can the source provide regarding “impact”?
What are the risks/cost-benefits if the targeted killing is delayed?
Does it justify immediate action? Or is the information insufficient to
justify a targeted killing but significant enough to justify other measures,
including detention (subject to operational considerations)?

Effective and lawful operational counterterrorism depends on the ability to
determine that a particular individual poses a threat. That is the essence of selfdefense, regardless of how it may be defined. Whether a potential is a threat in fact
requires an analysis of an extensive number and fluctuating degree of factors.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS IN PRACTICE
International law imposes on commanders the obligation to conduct
operational counterterrorism subject to the four questions below:30
1. Is the proposed action one of military necessity?
2. Is the proposed action proportional to the threat posed?
3. Are there no other viable alternatives to the proposed action?
4. Does the proposed action limit the amount of collateral damage?
According to the Caroline Doctrine, self-defense is limited to situations where
the “necessity of self-defence [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation,”31 and any action taken must be proportional
“since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it.”32 One of the most important limits on the
exercise of state power is that a potential attack be defined as imminent.
30

See Marco Sassoli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International Humanitarian
Law, HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. RES. INITIATIVE (Jan. 27–29, 2003), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Session1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VPW-4J3K]; Michael N. Schmitt,
Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the
Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 804 (2010); Military Necessity, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm
[https://perma.cc/LL97-U4HZ]; Customary IHL, Practice Relating to Rule 14.
Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14 [https://perma.cc/7LVZ-H4WG].
31
Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Special
Minister (July 27, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp#web1
[https://perma.cc/XK5G-9LDQ].
32
Id.
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Counterterrorism rooted in the rule of law must be particularly sensitive to
limits and standards. The former reflects appropriate use of state power, while the
latter reflects measures and means that can be applied to achievable lawful means.
In order to appreciate the danger inherent to a system devoid of accountability, it is
necessary to engage in discussion regarding a system predicated on accountability.33
The chart below examines four distinct incidents, highlighting the
consequences faced by those responsible for the decisions that resulted in collateral
damage. Those consequences are the essence of accountability necessarily at the
core of human decision making. While some have called for greater punishment for
those responsible, the chart reflects that decision making resulting in the
unwarranted loss of innocent life has consequences.

33

See Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional
Incidents that Occurred During Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 2, IDF MILITARY
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.mag.idf.il/261-6958en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/82WZ-F7PB] (explaining allegations of misconduct, and
the process for investigating that misconduct, and the results of investigations); Decisions of
the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents During Operation
‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 3, IDF MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (March 22,
2015), http://www.mag.idf.il/163-7183-en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/7HPZ-WCLL];
Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents that
Allegedly Occurred During Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 4, IDF MILITARY
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS (June 11, 2015), http://www.law.idf.il/163-7353en/Patzar.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3QU-N2JS]; Mossad Hit Team’s Big Mistake: 40 Years
Ago, Wrong Man Killed in Norway – New Reflections, SPIES AGAINST ARMAGEDDON (July
1, 2013), http://israelspy.com/mossad-hit-teams-big-mistake-40-years-ago-wrong-mankilled-in-norway-new-reflections/ [https://perma.cc/DQ4G-VZ98].
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Party

Israeli
Defense
Force (IDF)

Mossad
(Israeli
National
Intelligence
Agency)

United
States Air
Force
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Date & Incident

July 8 – August
26, 2014
Operation
“Protective
Edge”

July 21, 1973
“Lillehammer
Affair”
(attempted
assassination of
Ali Hassan
Salameh)

October 3,
2015
“Doctors
Without
Borders”
Bombing in
Kunduz,
Afghanistan

Details
During the suspension
of the Gaza ceasefire,
the IDF conducted
numerous military
operations in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
The MAG (Military
Advocate General)
assesses all claims
filed with the office for
war crime and criminal
liability and strives to
investigate every
incident fully.
Hundreds of claims are
investigated and,
among those, a very
small percentile are
ever recommended for
prosecutorial
consideration.
Misleading intel led
Israeli agents to kill
the wrong target,
instead resulting in the
death of a civilian
Moroccan immigrant.
It was later revealed
that agency personnel
knew their source was
unreliable.
U.S. military
incidentally bombs a
hospital in
Afghanistan, resulting
in the deaths of 42
persons and wounding
30 more.
The U.S. military
initially suggests the
attack was intended to
defend U.S. ground
forces before insisting
that the strike was
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Outcome

Allegations range vastly
across the criminal spectrum
– from looting to improper
killings of civilians – and
seldom do they result in
convictions. The MAG’s
procedural protections and
investigatory methods are
largely criticized as
incubating soldiers from
responsibility for their
actions while on mission.

The Israel Government has
never admitted its
involvement (though former
agents have come forward).
In 1996, Israel agreed to pay
$400,000 in compensation
to the surviving wife and
son of the slain.
President Barack Obama
issued a formal apology and
announced the U.S. would
make condolence payments
to the families of those
killed in the airstrike. Three
investigations were later
conducted by NATO, a joint
U.S.-Afghan group, and the
U.S. Department of Defense
(whose findings were
released on April 29, 2016).
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Forces.

NATO –
Colonel
Klein &
1st Sergeant
Wilhelm
(Germany)

September 4,
2009
Air strike near
Kunduz,
Afghanistan

Cockpit recordings
show the AC-130
operators questioned
the legality of the
operation.
Two tanker trucks
immobilized on a
sandbank were struck
by NATO bombers,
resulting in up to 142
casualties, many of
which were civilians.
No warning of an
attack was issued to
bystanders and no
explanation of the
military aim has ever
been provided.
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Médecins Sans
Frontières/Doctors Without
Borders has called for an
independent probe, arguing
the forces who conducted
the airstrike cannot be
entrusted to investigate the
incident impartially.

All charges against the two
officers were dismissed by
the German Federal
Prosecutor in 2010, who
concluded that the actions
were not culpable under
either International Law or
the German Criminal Code.

The contrast between the two—an accountability paradigm with clear lines of
command as distinguished from a paradigm whose lines of command and
accountability are unclear—is troubling. It requires resolution given the increasing
favor with which autonomous warfare is viewed. By clear lines of accountability I
refer to the example of current accountability models as enforced by the military,
with any decisions clearly delineated back to those responsible should error occur.
If faulty intelligence leads to a strike on a civilian target, the intelligence
analysts are to blame. If solid intelligence leads to a erroneous strike on a civilian
target, perhaps the targeting military operator is to blame.
This is not to say that computers and automated systems should not play any
role within the decision-making process. If there are algorithms or platforms that
can expediate or finepoint any part of the decision-making process, then surely any
military can and should benefit from such a dual partnership. However, it is my
assertion that this sort of a partnership can never be replaced by computers alone.
To consistently effectuate lawful targeted killings, I created a decision-making
tree intended to ensure the final determination incorporated relevant variables in the
invariably limited “window of opportunity.” The questions created many “forks in
the road.” Every answer lends itself to additional questions.
1. Is the commander on the ground and able to assess the situation
himself?
2. Is the potential target acting in a suspicious manner?
3. Is the military unit capable of successfully completing the targeted
killing?
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4. What are the geopolitical consequences of engaging in a targeted
killing of that person at that time?
5. Does it meet the international law test? Proportionality, military
necessity, collateral damage, alternatives?
Variable assessment depends on “reading” complex operational situations.
Invariably, mistakes can be made when human decision making incorporates
subjective and objective vector points. Analyzing available information is, naturally,
dependent on gathering information. As discussed above, determining whether
intelligence information is “actionable” requires the application of a four-part test
requiring analysis of received information received and its source. The two—
information and source—are intertwined.
The charts in Section III highlight the extraordinary complexity of operational
counterterrorism, in particular the human factor in the decision-making process.
The burden imposed—and obligation mandated—on soldiers and commanders
engaged in operational counterterrorism is to apply norms of proportionality and
distinction when assessing the legality of a proposed attack.
The principle of distinction—the differentiation between nonparticipant and
participant civilians and, therefore, potentially, a legitimate target—is of particular
importance when examining autonomous warfare. Proportionality imposes on the
nation-state obligations of restraint and avoiding excess when engaging an identified
legitimate target.
Failure to correctly assess these factors results in tragedy and violations of
international law. The question is whether assessments can be made by machine
rather than by humans. Rearticulated, is the autonomous warfare paradigm an
acceptable substitute to commanders presently tasked with assessing intelligence
information prior to engagement?
Commanders choosing to act on available information are subject to two
important caveats—corroborating that information provided by the source is reliable
and verifying that alternatives to threat mitigation are operationally unfeasible. Most
importantly, they are accountable for their decisions.
The Israel Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, addressed this
issue in The Public Committee against Torture in Israel vs. The Government of
Israel.34 In his seminal decision, President (Chief Justice) Barak wrote the following
regarding identification of the legitimate target:

34

HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of
Israel (2005) (Isr.), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Israel/Targetted_Killings
_Supreme_Court_13-12-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6GP-26A5].
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On the one hand, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities one single
time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself from that activity, is a
civilian who, starting from the time he detached himself from that activity,
is entitled to protection from attack. He is not to be attacked for the
hostilities which he committed in the past.35
Regarding protection of innocent civilians Barak wrote:
The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts
of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the
army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians
‘for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (§51(3) of The First
Protocol). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted,
on the condition that there is no other less harmful means, and on the
condition that innocent civilians nearby are not harmed. Harm to the latter
must be proportionate. That proportionality is determined according to a
values based test, intended to balance between the military advantage and
the civilian damage. As we have seen, we cannot determine that a
preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is
always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of
customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow
that preventative strike or not.36
The above represents the essence of Israel’s targeted killing policy that I was
involved in. Much of my perception of the issue is informed by this experience.
While I have no field experience with autonomous warfare, I am intimately familiar
with the consequences of a decision intended to result in the death of human being.
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice—carefully and
in an extraordinarily nuanced manner—parsed the definition of words critical to this
discussion. Barak’s opinions regarding the limits of state power emphasized the
requirement to balance individual rights with national security.37 That is the essence
of a democracy regardless of the nature of the “foe”; failing to robustly balance
undermines the legitimacy of state action. Similarly, Barak was of the controversial
opinion that the nation-state must fight terrorism with “one arm tied behind its back”
by engaging in self-imposed restraints.
Applying principles of balancing and self-imposed restraints in the context of
complex decision making is predicated on a significant number of critical
parameters including questions of law, morality, effectiveness, and geopolitics. The
question is whether autonomous warfare systems are simultaneously capable of
protecting individual rights while engaging in preemptive operational
counterterrorism when decision making demands extraordinary nuance.
35

Id. at ¶ 39.
Id. at ¶ 60.
37
See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 502 (2006).
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Autonomous warfare is a viscerally exciting concept for a new weapon—or
strategic undertaking—in warfare.
While serving as Commander of the IDF’s School of Military Law (IDF SML,
2001–2004), I had command responsibility for the development of an interactive
video teaching soldiers an IDF code of conduct, with particular emphasis on their
interaction with the Palestinian civilian population.38
The video became the subject of intensive Israeli and international attention
and was picked up by multiple media outlets. I was repeatedly asked the following
questions: Why make the video? Can you teach morality? How do you determine
effectiveness? The concept of teaching morality is rife with controversy—any
discussion is vigorous and spirited.
I felt soldiers could be taught to conduct themselves morally with the caveat
that the instruction creatively challenge them. In this respect, they were adopting my
moralistic dogma while also applying it to their own conscience, being, and future
actions. Senior IDF leadership accepted my position on attempting to codify and
teach certain aspects of morality, thus producing the pedagogy of the video.
Regarding evidence of effectiveness, I cannot point to empirical
demonstrations of success or failure. Simply put, “successful” morality, or even a
change in a person’s morality, is not a binary success/failure equation that can be
proven. I can, however, reference feedback we received from NGOs who noted
positive changes in soldier interaction with Palestinians after the introduction of the
video.
My reasons for implementing the video can best be explained two-fold: A
military in a democracy must act morally, and innumerable complaints filed by
human rights organizations regarding conduct/misconduct of IDF soldiers at
checkpoints, primarily in the West Bank, highlighted a systemic problem.
Someone—I do not recall who—brought to my attention a term used in the U.S.
military, “the strategic corporal.”39
I quickly adopted it when meeting with soldiers and commanders and
discussing the video and checkpoints. I found it a particularly effective metaphor in
explaining the dramatic impact of significant advancements in technology. The
onset of handheld mobile phones enabled instant communication between a
seemingly isolated incident at a checkpoint and the broader international
community.
Consequences regarding the court of international opinion were dramatic. The
need for instant explanation imposed significant burdens on the IDF. More
importantly, visuals enabled us to better understand particular events: Where
soldiers needed to be punished, punishment was meted out; where Palestinian
reports of soldier misconduct were shown to be incorrect, it greatly facilitated
explaining particular events and their broader significance.
38
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The reality of instant communication required the corporal address the
operational question at hand with greater sensitivity. A worldwide audience could
be privy to his decision making in real time. It was increasingly difficult to hide
behind traditional responses that information is being gathered and will be studied
in due time. The event was readily accessible to anyone with a TV, much less a
computer.
To enhance the corporal’s decision making capabilities, a number of initiatives
were undertaken, including creation of a new position: Check Point Commander
(“CPC”) and a training program with the specific purpose of preparing individuals
for this position. The video was an integral part of both. What is important is that
the concept of “strategic corporal” emphasized individual accountability and
responsibility.
I am particularly taken by Professor Heather Roff’s term, “The Strategic
Robot.” More than any other articulation of this phenomenon, Professor Roff’s has
deeply influenced my perception of weapons of the future. The term captures the
most problematic aspect of autonomous warfare. Professor Roff’s term is of
particular interest to me because it suggests a dramatic transformation from the
corporal to AWS. The corporal accountability model is universally understood and
accepted: A soldier “owns” mistakes and is culpable for misconduct. The strategic
robot model raises questions of profound importance regarding the essence of
soldiering—accountability and responsibility.
The lack of current research and discussion regarding accountability as it
pertains to AWS either suggests it has not yet been questioned or that there will be
a penchant for lack of transparency. As I discuss below, that gap is deeply troubling.
The “strategic robot” reflects a paradigm shift reflecting the future of military
engagement. The consequences are of utmost importance to military commanders,
national security decision makers, public officials, and the broader public.
The juxtaposition of the two words—“strategic” and “robot”—suggests a powerful
paradigm shift in how warfare is conducted. The transformation from soldier to
strategic robot must give us pause. It is not a semantic change but rather a substantive
shift demanding close scrutiny and skepticism. “Strategic” is distinct from
“tactical”; the former is an overarching, long-term plan and goal, while the latter
refers to the short-term implementation and application.
The shift to a paradigm whereby human decision making is significantly
limited represents a profound strategic shift. In traditional military engagement
between nation-states, armies engage with armies; it is the axiomatic “tankstanks/planes-planes” paradigm. Both sides possessed enormous arsenals, with the
most sophisticated “state of the art” weapons causing massive destruction.
In the increasingly predominant conflict between state actors and nonstate
actors, the former possesses overwhelming force. The only question is whether the
available weapons will be applied in accordance with international law and the selfimposed restraints previously referenced.
The shift is a direct product of the onset of the age of terrorism and the end of
conflict between nation-states. This is an extraordinary geopolitical and geostrategic
transformation with profound consequences. The shift requires a rearticulation of
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goals, purposes, and missions particularly because many targets and enemies operate
without uniforms, borders, or limits themselves. One of the inevitable ramifications
is the development and adoption of weapons that enable the nation-state to narrow
the focus of engagement to a particular individual or group of individuals.
While the operational focus of counterterrorism is far narrower than traditional
military engagement, the question is what that shift tolerates regarding decision
making in AWS. More precisely, the inquiry involves whether this profound change
need result in the minimization of human involvement in the decision-making
process. That, in many ways, is the essence of autonomous warfare favoring
“humans out of the loop” as compared to contemporary counterterrorism driven by
“humans in the loop.”
The “humans in the loop” model also applies to traditional warfare. There is,
then, greater similarity between traditional warfare and operational counterterrorism
than between the latter and autonomous warfare. The emphasis on “humans out of
the loop” is unique to autonomous warfare; both traditional warfare and operational
counterterrorism emphasize human decision making predicated on accountability
and responsibility.
The long-term consequences of this proposed new normal go well beyond the
introduction of an improved weapons system or a tactical shift in combat theory and
practice. If indeed the strategic robot truly emerges as the new weapon of choice, it
will be arguably the most significant change in warfare in centuries. Whether it is
the most significant transformation in the history of human conflict-engagement is
the subject of a different inquiry.
What is relevant, however, is addressing, and, ultimately, determining whether
standards, criteria, and accountability inherent to operational counterterrorism
rooted in the rule of law are transferable to this newly developing “human out of the
loop” autonomous warfare.
IV. ENSURING COMPLIANCE
The difference in the proposed paradigms is the means by which an individual
is killed. Given the seeming tenuousness between human decision making and
autonomous warfare, accountability standards must be stricter than in the existing
means of killing a supposedly legitimate target. In traditional military engagement,
the essence of command responsibility is accountability for all actions and their
results. It is essential that a similar model be applied to autonomous warfare.
According to the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External
Policies, Policy Department report on Human Rights Implications of the Usage of
Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare:
The fundamental principle that governmental power and authority must be
exercised in accordance with clear, legitimate and enforceable rules lies
not only at the heart of liberal democracies—it encapsulates the very
essence of the rule of law. . . . Transparency and accountability must be
taken particularly seriously when States resort to lethal force as a matter
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of foreign policy. . . . At the most basic level, legal accountability requires
the recognition that States remain legally responsible for the consequences
of their use of robotic weapons irrespective of the operational autonomy
achieved by such systems.40
The troubling nature of autonomous warfare is manifested by the clear desire
to minimize human involvement in its application. That raises significant concern
because the human element is essential to fully informed decision making when
killing is the stated objective. To remove the human element from ascertaining the
extent to which a person poses an imminent threat is to create a paradigm whereby
nuance and subtlety are largely eviscerated. Computers cannot process, much less
resolve, grey areas as this is the essence of human judgement. In essence, if you plug
X question into a computer, it is going to be programmed to respond YES or NO,
not MAYBE, and this is what you find problematic, because sometimes “maybe” or
“depends” or “perhaps” is the best possible answer to a given question. How do you
program morality into a computer? What kind of morality do you use? To which
ethicist are you prescribing a doctrine?
The reliance on autonomous systems as “decision makers” has raised
objections that Professors Ken Anderson and Matthew Waxman correctly
summarize as: “The third objection [to robotic warfare, ANG] holds that
autonomous weapons systems that remove the human being from the firing loop are
unacceptable because they undermine the possibility of holding anyone accountable
for what, if done by a human soldier, might be a war crime.”41
Implementing robust accountability standards and criteria is “at risk” when
decision making has been largely removed from commanders. Person-specific
counterterrorism—the specific identification of a particular individual—depends on
sophisticated analysis of the decision making vectors highlighted in the charts above.
The application of those vectors in a time-sensitive environment when a
“kill/not kill” decision is in the balance is, I believe, the greatest challenge to those
involved in operational counterterrorism. It is the decision point with the greatest
stakes and most compelling consequences and ramifications.
Commanders are trained to lead, assess, decide, and assume responsibility for
consequences of their decisions. The expression “command is lonely” captures the
essence of accountability for decisions made. The four requirements—leading,
assessing, deciding, and accountability—are integral to the targeted killing paradigm
previously addressed.
A decision-making process rooted in the rule of law and principles of morality
will implement the charts interspersed throughout this article. Doing so facilitates
rationale-based decision making which then incorporates these relevant
40
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considerations. The commander’s decision reflects situational awareness,
circumstantial assessment of “on the ground” realities, previous experience, unitcapability experience, flexibility-nuance regarding orders received, viability of
alternatives, “exit” policy, and the capability of successfully accomplishing the
mission.
Case in point: An IDF battalion commander42 was given an order to detain
three suspected terrorists in Nablus. When approaching the city, the commander
received an urgent update from his intelligence officer that while spotters had
located the suspected terrorists, they were surrounded by school-age children. The
commander had, according to his analysis, three options: (1) cancel the mission; (2)
proceed with the mission, regardless of the consequences to the children; or (3)
engage in “cat and mouse” with the terrorists. The commander decided to cancel the
mission. He reasoned that the costs of collateral damage did not outweigh the
benefits accrued from arresting the three and the mission could be achieved at a later
date.
There was, from the commander’s perspective, two-fold accountability—
mission achievement would result in significant collateral damage, while mission
cancellation would, conceivably, facilitate terrorist escape and enable the local
community to view the IDF as “weak.”43
While this example is not directly related to targeted killing it highlights both
the issue of accountability and the consequence of minimizing, if not eviscerating,
human input in decision making. There are, as discussed in Section II, distinct
categories of “humans in the loop” decision-making paradigms integral to
autonomous warfare. There must be an individual present to exercise discretion
when determining whether to engage in a targeted killing.
It goes without saying that mistakes are made in assessing the quality of the
intelligence received, in perceiving the actions of the identified target, in incorrectly
determining the imminence of the presumed threat, and in the manner in which the
attack is conducted.
While in these instances decisions were implemented without all factors taken
into careful and thorough consideration, decision makers, to varying degrees, were
held accountable. Accountability is the essence of command. Command structure is
dependent on proper delegation of responsibility and accountability. Soldiers and
commanders alike depend on a command structure that ensures military discipline,
clear lines of command, and a confirmation of systemic and institutionalized
principles of accountability and responsibility.
That is the essence of a military and is essential for mission articulation and
achievement. Failure to create, and ensure, a clear chain of command raises
significant concerns regarding the proper functioning of a military unit. The core of
a military unit is discipline and accountability; the former is the “heart and soul” of
a military, while the latter ensures consequences for mistakes, intentional or
otherwise.
42
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The commander shared the story with me when I was serving in the IDF.
The decision to “reverse” was witnessed by many Palestinians.
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The constant in the decision-making tree was command accountability. My
questions were directed exclusively at the commander; my recommendation was
dependent on his answers. Those answers were based on his “on the ground”
assessment reflecting professional experience, military training, understanding of
the threat posed, recognition of the costs and benefits of undertaking or not
undertaking the operation, application of international law principles of
proportionality, distinction, collateral damage, and alternatives. The individual
soldier bears responsibility for actions taken and commands given.
I find this process of fundamental importance because the clarity guided me
throughout my career, both with respect to my actions and those of others. I believe
my personal experiences and insight can provide valuable input for the vast majority
of both civilians and military personnel who have never been faced with such
decisions and may be unable to fathom the complexities that accompany ordering
the death of another individual. Those same standards of accountability must be
applied to autonomous warfare decision making and its consequences. There can be
no middle ground or wiggle room in this matter.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the potential application of autonomous warfare presents
change. Change in this context is not intended either as a “positive” or a “negative,”
but instead as the acknowledgment of a new reality viewed favorably by some and
with extreme distress by others. The primary source of concern focuses on the
transfer of the decision-making process and issues of responsibility and
accountability onto artificial intelligence rather than that developed by humans.
These are profound strategic questions which extend significantly beyond the
issues of tactics and specific applications. While the targeted killing paradigm raises
important and complicated questions and concerns, the degree of human
involvement in the decision-making process has not been raised as a point of
controversy or opposition. That is why, as suggested above, operational
counterterrorism—of which targeted killing is but one example—more closely
resembles traditional military engagement than autonomous warfare.
The suggestion that AWS are strategic goes to the heart of the issue. By labeling
it as a strategic entity, the term implies the autonomous system replaces the soldier
in importance.
Enhanced robotic warfare utilizes highly technologically advanced AWS to
significantly minimize human decision making, emphasizing algorithms and
mathematical modeling in determining when an individual may be targeted for a
targeted killing. Robotic warfare is undoubtedly seductive. It reduces the presence
of “boots on the ground.” However, minimization of morality—if not totally
ignoring its significance—poses an extraordinarily dangerous honeytrap of
temptation.
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In warfare, it is a mistake to think that morality stands still. Thinking about
the ethics of war shifts frequently to accommodate technological change.
At the beginning of World War I, submarine warfare was considered
cowardly and inhuman. At the start of World War II, both sides agreed not
to bomb civilians. In both cases, the sphere of the permissible widened to
accommodate the realities of the conflict. After Vietnam, some attempt
was made to incorporate the wholesale slaughter of civilians within a more
agreeable perspective.44
The concept of morality has evolved over thousands of years. The introduction
of morality into war and armed conflict is one of the most fluid and dynamic aspects
of conflict, oftentimes creating a “gray zone” of questionable application of weapons
and strategies within the spectrum of armed conflict. Counterterrorism has presented
similar questions of morality within the broader scope of conflict between
asymmetrical forces.
Who is a “civilian” and who are “legitimate targets” are examples of the “gray
zone” in operational counterterrorism. Decision making regarding application of the
terms is complicated and sensitive. How AWS, or robots, would “define” and
“apply” terminology in the context of autonomous warfare is at the crux of the
dilemma regarding nonhuman decision making.
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